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The contributions to this second volume of essays derived 
from events organized by the Centre for Research in Modern 
European Philosophy (CRMEP) have their source in the confer-
ence ‘Thinking Art’, held at the Institute for Contemporary Arts 
(ICA) London on 29 February 2020, immediately prior to the 
Covid-19 lockdown.1 As previously, the idea was to assemble an 
eclectic range of national and international speakers to present 
parts of their ongoing research, in order to provide a snapshot 
of current work on topics in which philosophical and general-
theoretical issues are at stake within and across a range of 
related disciplines. Here this includes digital humanities, poetics, 
fine art, art history, gender studies, philosophy itself, visual 
culture and postcolonial studies. In its broader sense, philosophy 
is conceived here as a transdisciplinary medium through which 
connections may be made between, and critical reflection 
provoked about, the general-theoretical aspects of concrete 
investigations. The fourfold thematic constellation of material-
isms, art and labour, instabilities of form, and social ecologies 
and intimations of catastrophe – plucked from the ether of the 
1. Klara Kemp-Welch and Christian Nyampeta were unable to attend the conference, 
but have generously made their work available here.
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present – functioned both to connect and to hold apart the 
various presentations.
The unifying conceit, on this occasion, lay in repeating 
a trope from the ICA’s past – ‘Thinking Art’2 – not in order 
to return to that time, but rather to take the measure of the 
present’s distance from it, registered in current preoccupations 
and concerns. Back then, at the outset of the 1990s, interrogation 
of the relationship between philosophy and art was still largely 
driven by the critical and political legacies of conceptual art, and 
the various anti-aesthetic agendas they bequeathed to academic 
study of art. The theoretical resources deployed, in the UK, were 
largely those of German critical theory, French philosophies of 
difference (including Lacanian psychoanalysis) and feminist art 
history. The polemical context was the attempt to maintain the 
momentum of the critical movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
beyond a traditional aesthetics which was being revived at that 
time, mainly in phenomenological forms, on the back of the so-
called ‘return to painting’ of the 1980s, spearheaded by German 
neo-expressionism.3 The lines of engagement were clearly drawn.
In the decade that followed, however, those lines quickly 
became blurred, as post-phenomenological French philosophies 
of ‘affect’ moved into the conceptual space vacated by ‘aesthetic’, 
in a manner that combined claims to philosophical radicalism 
with an artistic conservatism and covert political romanticism.4 
2. See Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, eds, Thinking Art: Beyond Traditional 
Aesthetics, London: Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), 1991 – the inaugural 
publication of the ICA’s Philosophical Forum, set up the previous year by its then 
Director of Talks, Linda Brandon.
3. In the UK, the emblematic exhibition was A New Spirit in Painting at the Royal 
Academy of Arts in 1981. Work by artists from that show have been reassembled this 
year, at the Whitechapel Gallery, in The Return of the Spirit in Painting, alongside a 
companion exhibition, Radical Figures: Painting in the New Millennium. Whether this pair 
of shows reveals the enduring ‘radicalism’ of painting (qua painting) or merely reaffirms 
the deepening conservative political function of its cyclical ‘returns’ is a moot point.
4. The rhythm of this movement was overdetermined by the somewhat haphazard 
temporality of translation. Lyotard’s 1974 Libidinal Economy first appeared in English 
in 1993; Deleuze’s 1981 Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (the most influential of 
these texts) in 2003. Meanwhile, Lyotard’s more philosophically significant work of 1971, 
Discourse, Figure, was not translated into English until 2019.
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At the same time, new forms of cultural management appropri-
ated, academicized and contained the critical tendencies of 
the 1980s within the new cultural-industrial forms imposed 
on universities (including the incorporation of the art schools), 
in a series of ideological waves, the neoliberal force of which 
continues to build.5 With the decline of the supportive political 
cultures from which they had arisen, art practices concerned 
to triangulate relations between concept, politics and critique 
retreated in the face of institutional developments associated 
with the growing primacy of markets, involving not only the 
integration of museums, galleries and other kinds of art spaces 
into the entertainment industries, but the institutions of art edu-
cation themselves. Critical conceptions of the culture industry 
were displaced by affirmative, governmental concepts of ‘creative 
industries’. In the new university art schools, little art-theoretical 
reflection, or even more straightforward forms of art-historical 
knowledge, were judged necessary for the projected vocational 
aspirations of students redesignated as clients. This was the 
point at which right-wing attacks on the ‘elitism’ of the arts and 
humanities provided ‘market democracy’ with its most effective 
political argument – three decades after the left-populist version 
of that critique had begun to transform those disciplines them-
selves, in a process derided by the Right as ‘dumbing down’.
Today, the philosophical debates that set the intellectual tone 
of the anglophone artworld largely concern so-called ‘new’ – 
especially ‘vital’ and ‘speculative’ – materialisms; the changing 
and precarious character of labour; the dematerializing effects 
of social relations and technologies on the destabilization of 
formal categories; and ecological crisis, postcoloniality and the 
Anthropo cene. The four sections of this book take up variants 
5. The Hochschule der Künste Berlin became a university in 2001, for example; 
University of the Arts London was formed in 2003–4 out of the bulk of the London arts’ 
colleges.
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of these themes, respectively, in variously critical ways. What 
unifies the essays is not any particular theoretical stance, but a 
concern to maintain a thinking of art and its related discourses 
that is sceptical of all attempts to use the new eco-naturalisms 
and vitalisms as an alibi for stopping thinking about art socially. 
In an art context, the flight from thinking socially cannot avoid 
becoming a neo-aestheticism – whatever its theoretical modali-
ties and purported political intent. 
The question that opened the Introduction to the previous 
collection of essays with the same title as this one, thirty years 
ago – ‘In what way, if any, does art need philosophy, or phil-
osophy art?’ – unanswered then, remains as open and contested 
today as it ever was; and equally, if not more likely to provoke 
anxiety, on both sides. All the more reason, one might think, for 




I would like to thank Richard Birkett for initiating the renewed 
collaboration between the ICA London and CRMEP in 2018, 
which led to the conference from which this book derives; and 
the ICA curators Nydia Swaby and Sara Sassanelli, for taking it 
on and seeing it through to completion with such equanimity.







‘How are we to understand the concept of artistic form today?’ 
and ‘What are its relations to social form?’1 In particular, if we 
understand social form to be immanent to artistic form, how 
is this immanence to be reflectively constructed, expressed and 
interpreted at this particular historical moment? And if it is 
‘the unresolved antagonisms of reality’ that ‘return in artworks 
as immanent problems of their form’,2 what do the problems of 
form in contemporary art have to tell us about the unresolved 
antagonisms of our reality today?
The movement of contemporary art
In approaching these questions, a fundamental difficulty appears 
at the outset: in contemporary art the very category of form 
appears problematic.3 Indeed, the concept of form marks one of 
1. An earlier version of parts of this text was presented as a public lecture at Chelsea 
College of Arts, University of the Arts London (12 January 2017), to the conference ‘Crisis 
as Form: Revisions to the History of the Present’, University of Applied Arts Vienna 
(27 January 2017) and at Yale University School of Art (2 October 2017). I am grateful to 
Helmut Draxler for the invitation to the Vienna conference.
2. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1997 (1970), p. 6. 
3. Contemporary art, that is, in the critical historical sense which that phrase has 
come to acquire over the last twenty-five years or so, which may be projected back, 
interpretatively, broadly speaking, to artistic transformations of the late 1950s. See Peter 
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the main difficulties of contemporary art practice and criticism 
alike: namely, how to give general social and historical signifi-
cance (and hence, in the classical terminology, ‘universality’) 
to increasingly ‘individual’ – highly individuated – works? The 
difficulty is twofold. It derives from the fact that contemporary 
art is a field of generically artistic practices that developed via its 
Euro–North American heartlands in reaction against both (i) the 
formal critical norms of medium-specific modernisms and their 
transformative reproduction and extension of the old, Renais-
sance ‘system of the arts’, and (ii) the residual cultural authority 
of all other received aesthetic forms and universals – residual, 
that is, from the standpoint of the thesis of the ten dentially 
increasing nominalism or individuality of works of art in liberal 
(now neoliberal) capitalist societies.4 This nominalism – inherent 
in the social logic of autonomous art, and exacerbated in artistic 
resistance to the reduction of form to the cultural technology of 
‘formats’5 – has been intensified, or raised to a higher power, by 
the dissolution of the boundaries between the arts. In reaction, 
the countervailing forces of new, increasingly socialized artistic 
forms, characteristic of the last three decades, have been pro-
voked.6 In this respect, the field of contemporary art as a field of 
generically artistic practices exhibits a double and contradictory 
movement of the attempted dissolution and the reflective, expanded 
restitution of artistic form. The problematicity of form, then, 
Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art, London and New York: 
Verso, 2013, pp. 18–22.
4. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp. 42, 199–202, 219–22. This tendency has now, of 
course, been geopolitically generalized via the ‘globalization’ of the Western art system, 
irrespective of the particular ‘varieties’ of capitalist societies into which this system of 
institutions intrudes. This is the respect in which transnational art institutions are at the 
vanguard of the geopolitical spread of ‘neoliberalized’ forms of capitalism, irrespective of 
the ideological content of the particular works they exhibit. 
5. See David Joselit, After Art, Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2013. Joselit treats this reduction positivistically, rather than critically, thereby exiting the 
field of art criticism.
6. These successive social, political and activist ‘turns’ since the 1990s repeat the 
structures of various anti-institutional artistic practices that can be traced back to 
the 1960s. The difference primarily lies in the more general, institutionally recognized 
prevalence of the more recent variants.
161Notes oN form
manifests itself historically, primarily, as an attempted dissolu-
tion and reflective expansion of artistic form itself.
This double movement re-enacts the problematic character 
of social form in late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century 
capitalism that is a product of the contradictory structure of 
capitalistic individuality as such, in both its promise (the freedom 
of the individual as a ‘self-possessing’ subject of exchange 
relations – call it consumer sovereignty) and its reality (the lack of 
self-possession, or dispossession, manifest in the asocial same-
ness of the indifference of the system of exchange to the individ-
uals who make it up – call it alienation and the debt society). In 
this respect, we might say, contemporary art is a mimesis of the 
broken ‘promise of happiness’ not merely of art but of capitalism 
itself.7 Art is the agent of the secret discontent of capitalist societies 
with their own rules, we might say.8 In its contradictory dissolu-
tion and reflective expansion of artistic form, contemporary art 
reflects the contradictory structure of capitalistic sociality as a 
mediated dissolution – a constant dissolution and transformed 
reinstatement – of the social itself. This is a reinstatement of 
the social at the level of form alone – commodity form, money, 
capital and the state – alienated from its constitutive relations 
between individuals. This is the Polanyian dimension of capital-
ism, recently analytically revived by the German sociologist and 
critical theorist Wolfgang Streeck: a cannibalistic capitalism that 
erodes its own anthropological and social conditions by eroding 
the living sociality of the social as such. It is a contradictory 
structure that has been intensified by the political-economic 
strategies of neoliberalism since the end of the 1970s, in which 
Hayek’s Road to Serfdom belatedly prevailed over Polanyi’s The 
7. On art’s breaking of what Stendhal saw as its ‘promise of happiness’, see Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 311. 
8. Cf. Benjamin on Baudelaire as the ‘agent of a secret discontent of his class with 
its own rule’, in Walter Benjamin, Addendum to ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire’, in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, London and 
New York: Verso, 1989, p. 104.
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Great Transformation; although that hegemony currently appears 
to be crumbling, at least to some extent.9
In the Euro–North American context, which dominated 
international artworld debates at the time, at the height of the 
reaction against Greenberg’s modernist formalism in the second 
half of the 1960s, the double movement of the attempted dissolu-
tion and the reflective expansion of artistic form, constituting 
the field of contemporary art more widely, went under the 
general heading of ‘post-formalism’. This was not just a reaction 
in the field of criticism, and of art practices tied directly to it, but 
involved a wider sense of what, in his 1967 book Beyond Modern 
Sculpture, Jack Burnham called ‘form exhaustion’.10 Burnham 
attributed this to the effect on art of science and technology, but 
it was equally the effect of the social power of the individualism 
that drove the cultural transformations of the 1960s in those 
‘consumer societies’ that benefited from the post-World War 
II boom. Robert Smithson diagnosed the paradoxical reaction 
of galleries and museums to this situation in terms of an ‘ava-
lanche’ of new (yet merely nominal) categories.11 This categorial 
nominalism produced ‘curation’ in its contemporary sense, as 
a practice of temporary sense-making via exhibition-making, 
rather than the care of a collection over a prolonged period of 
         9. Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System, London and 
New York: Verso, 2016; F.A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, London and New York: Routledge, 
2001 (1944); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of our Time, Boston MA: Beacon Press, 2002 (1944). Intriguingly, recent disputes over 
neoliberalism and the meaning of contemporary capitalism have defaulted to a replay 
of a dispute between two Austrian economic historians of the 1940s, on the cusp of 
the post-war reconstruction of Western capitalist societies. For the revival of Polanyian 
analyses, see Nancy Fraser, ‘Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Toward a 
Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derlugian, 
eds, Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown, New York: NYU Press, 
2011, pp. 137–58, and ‘A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi’, New 
Left Review 81 (May–June 2013), pp. 119–32.
10. Jack Burnham, Beyond Modern Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on 
the Sculpture of This Century, New York: George Braziller, 1967, pp. 167–81.
11. Robert Smithson, ‘What is a Museum? A Conversation between Allan Kaprow and 
Robert Smithson’ (1967), in Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996, p. 40. Cf. Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, ch. 4.
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time. ‘Curation’ in this sense has become central to art institu-
tions since it gives partial and temporary social and historical 
meaning to highly individualized works via new relational 
configurations. 
‘Form exhaustion’, Burnham argued, had led to ‘The Rise of 
Phenomenalism’ and a consequent critical transition from ‘pure 
form’ to what he called ‘pure experience’. This corresponded to a 
shift of focus, at the level of the work, away from form towards 
a preoccupation with materials (and their often industrially 
produced technical properties), along with an opening of works 
onto their own incompletions – often through serialism, but 
more generally through any means for introducing time into the 
constitution of the work, especially performance, along with a 
growing sense of the constitutive role of context. This led to a 
certain immaterialism, associated with the conceptual dimension 
of works and a corresponding uncertainty as to how to locate the 
boundaries or limits of individual works. This was summed up 
in 1969 by Victor Burgin in the concept of ‘situational aesthetics’, 
in an article published in the same issue of Studio International as 
the first part of Joseph Kosuth’s more notorious ‘Art and Philoso-
phy’ – thereby inaugurating the double trajectory of anglophone 
conceptual art: relational and linguistic (post-formalist and 
neo-formalist).12 The former led to the contextual and relational 
art of the 1980s and 1990s; the latter to various conceptual 
formalisms, including the mimetic neo-conceptualisms of the 
1990s and early 2000s.13 
However, as a merely abstract negation, unable to connect 
itself immanently to the multiple determinacies of its prolif-
erating objects, post-formalism did not last long as a critical 
12. Victor Burgin, ‘Situational Aesthetics’, Studio International, vol. 178, no. 915 (October 
1969), pp. 118–21; Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art and Philosophy: Part 1’, ibid., pp. 134–7. 
13. These historicist neo-conceptualisms (of, for example, in the UK, Simon Paterson, 
Gavin Turk, Martin Creed and, most reductively, Jonathan Monk) should be distinguished, 
in principle, from the most general postconceptual character of contemporary art. 
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category; less time even than its successor, postmodernism. 
Nonetheless, the impulse of post-formalism acquired a more 
enduring, more determinate legacy (different from the critical 
pluralism that had morphed into the early Hal Foster’s ‘critical 
postmodernism’) through the idea of the ‘expansion of art’: the 
expansion of art to infinity, through the expansion to infinity 
of the field of possible artistic materials.14 This idea should be 
distinguished in principle from Rosalind Krauss’s concept of 
the ‘expanded field’, with which it is often conflated, in which 
Krauss exchanged Greenberg’s aesthetic formalism for the 
theoretical formalism (or theoreticism) of a general semiotics 
applied directly to the artistic field.15 For the expansion of the 
‘field’ – understood by Krauss in a restricted semiotic manner, 
as the expansion of the field of significant differences through 
which artistic meaning is produced – was actually more 
fundamentally the breaking down – and thereby expansion to 
infinity – of the borders of the work itself, through the inclusion 
of new materials: not simply by breaking down the borders 
between the different arts, but more fundamentally the borders 
between art and non-art, or what, with slightly more paradoxical 
ontological nuance, Adorno called the borders between art and 
‘the empirical’ (der Empirie).
However, rather than consummating the dissolution of form, 
the ‘expansion of art’ found its critical and curatorial correlate 
in the motif of ‘becoming form’, emblematically in the phrase 
‘When Attitudes Become Form’, from the opening to the subtitle 
of Harald Szeeman’s famous exhibition (its main title was Live 
14. In Western Europe in the late 1960s this idea was mainly associated with Joseph 
Beuys and a group of artists centred on the triangle Vienna–Cologne–Düsseldorf, 
promoted by the journal Interfunctionen. See Friedrich W. Heubach, ‘Interfunctionen, 
1968–1975’, in Gloria Moure, ed., Behind the Facts: Interfunctionen, 1968–1975, Barcelona: 
Ediciones Polígrafa, 2004, pp. 48–59. For the Eastern European story, see Klara Kemp-
Welch, Networking the Block: Experimental Art in Eastern Europe, 1965–1981, Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 2018.
15. Rosalind E. Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ (1979), in The Originality of the 
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 1985, 
pp. 276–90.
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in Your Head) at the Kunsthalle, Berne, 1969. Symptomatically, 
this was the phrase by which the exhibition subsequently 
became generally known. (The full subtitle was ‘When Attitudes 
Become Form [Works – Concepts – Processes – Situations – 
Information]’, and that list is obviously important in giving the 
exhibition some critical determinacy.) In the wake of the recent 
revisionist historiography of the exhibitions of the 1960s, this 
motif of ‘becoming form’ has been revived and repeated anew 
in ever more expansive critical contexts.16 In the last twenty 
years, ‘latitudes’ have become form, along with ‘history’ and 
even ‘living’ itself.17 More prosaically, in 2013 Elena Filipovic 
suggested that with the rise of the artist-curator, ‘Exhibitions 
Become Form’ – borrowing her title from a review of the Venice 
remake of Attitudes – although of course exhibitions don’t need 
an artist-curator to do that; and they have in any case been ‘form’ 
from the outset of the contemporary conception of curation.18 
The basic movement of contemporary art, then, has involved 
an expansion of the concept of art through its dissolution into 
and reflective absorption of fields of – not just previously, but 
enduringly – non-art materials and practices. This correspond-
ingly expanded the extension of ‘artistic form’, while requiring 
the work’s simultaneous preservation of the non-art status of 
16. It is significant that when Szeeman’s show was restaged at the Prada Foundation in 
Venice in 2013, not only had the main title of the original disappeared (Live in Your Head 
was too counterculturally 1960s perhaps), but the rest of the subtitle has disappeared 
too, thereby eliminating the extremes of the conceptual constellation across which the 
exhibition had been constructed, and which provided it with its internal dynamism.
17. How Latitudes Become Form: Art in a Global Age (2003) was an exhibition in the 
Walker Center, Minneapolis, held in the wake of the 2000 Global Conceptualism show; 
History Becomes Form (2010) sums up Boris Groys’s analysis of Moscow Conceptualism; 
Nato Thompson’s Living as Form (2012) is the slogan of an art activism of the everyday.
18. When Exhibitions Become Form: The Rise of the Artist-Curator is now a series 
edited by Filipovic for Mousse Magazine. This ‘curator-artist’-centric conception of 
form-production appears as a disavowal of the critical recognition that the location of 
the principle of form-determination cannot be found in the subjectivity of the artist, but 
is rather distributed across the process of artistic production as a whole and condensed 
into the structural logic or coherence of the work itself. Transposing the old myth of the 
artist as the subjective origin of creative form onto the curator appears here as a doubly 
reactionary move. For a broader approach to exhibitions, see the Exhibition Histories 
series of books published by the journal Afterall, 2010–20. 
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certain of its new elements within their formal integration. 
For the criticality of this integration depends on the ontological 
double-coding of these elements, as at once inside and outside 
the work, in a manner paradigmatically exemplified by collage. 
It is this kind of double-coding constituting the critical status of 
the work, their contradictory structure, and the developmental 
dynamic they impart to the concept of art that suggests dialecti-
cal logic as a philosophical key to the comprehension of the 
concept of artistic form.19 At the same time, a new question 
arises: namely, what, if anything, delimits this expansion of the 
concept of artistic form, at the level of the individual work, if the 
range of possible artistic materials is in principle infinite? 
Before we consider this, though, we need to backtrack a little 
to the traditional, ‘hylomorphic’ concept of form, which the self-
expansion of art since the 1960s effectively destroyed as a viable 
model for the philosophical comprehension of art, in both its 
objective (Aristotelian) and subjective (Kantian) variants; along 
with the Simondonian nominalist alternative that is taken by 
some as the best option for their replacement as a philosophical 
account of the process of artistic creation.
Hylomorphism and its nominalist critique
Derived etymologically from the Greek hylé (wood or matter) 
and morphé (shape or form), but coined only in the nineteenth 
century, the term ‘hylomorphism’ indicates that it is matter to 
which form is opposed in the traditional Aristotlean concep-
tion, in a manner derived via generalizing abstraction from the 
19. ‘Objective logic’, Hegel argued, ‘most directly replaces ontology’, although ‘it 
comprises within itself also the rest of metaphysics’. Subjective logic, on the other hand, 
the logic of the concept, takes up the determinations presented in the objective logic 
‘in themselves according to their particular content’, and expounds them as ‘something 
subjective, freely self-subsisting, self-determining’. Thus was ontology transformed by 
Hegel’s dialectical logic into the first historical ontology: a historical ontology of spirit 
(Geist). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 42.
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sculptural activity of shaping wood. Hylomorphism is the philo-
sophical theory that being is a combination of form and matter 
within which matter is potential (indeterminate, unchanging and 
infinite) and form is actual and substantial: giving determinacy 
to matter, in each instance. Hence the ontological prioritization 
of form over ‘mere’ matter. Matter is denigrated as homogeneous 
and shapeless; form is lauded as meaning-giving. In particular, 
on this familiar conception, matter is essentially indifferent to 
the forms by which it is shaped.20 
The problem with this view, as now-canonically pointed out 
in Gilbert Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism (crudely put) is 
that it is an inadequate account of individuation, since it reduces 
individuals to no more than particular instances of general forms, 
or particulars, rather than individuating them ontologically. In 
Simendon’s well-known example, the pouring of concrete into a 
mould, form is hylomorphically understood to reside exclusively 
in the mould, and to be imposed externally upon an indifferent 
matter. In contrast, Simendon sought an account of individu-
ation (physical, biological, psychic and collective) as a monistic 
process of the emergence of individuals out of ‘pre-individual’ 
processes of being, which leave their mark within individuals in a 
residual transindividuality. Hence the idea that all individuals are 
transindividuals. Yet only individuals are actual; this a nominalist 
ontology. Matter is thus understood as an active material agent 
with no need of an external form to impose itself from without.21 
As presented by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus:
Simondon exposes the technological insufficiency of the matter–
form model, in that it assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed 
homogeneous. It is the idea of the law that assures the model’s 
20. See Aristotle, Metaphysics; Physics, Book II, ch. 7. The debates regarding 
the ontological consistency, or otherwise, of the definitions of form in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics and physics do not bear on the basic hylomorphic structure of the concept.
21. See Gilbert Simondon, L’ individual et sa genèse physico-biologique, Paris: PUF, 
1964, ch. 1; Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, 
Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 2013.
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coherence, since laws are what submit matter to this or that form, 
and conversely, realize in matter a given property deduced from the 
form. … Simondon demonstrates that the hylomorphic model leaves 
many things, active and affective, by the wayside. On the one hand, 
to the formed or formable matter we must add an entire energetic 
materiality in movement, carrying singularities or haecceities that 
are already like implicit forms that are topological, rather than 
geometrical, and that combine with processes of deformation. 
… On the other hand, to the essential properties of the matter 
[deriving from the formal essences] we must add variable intensive 
affects, now resulting from the operation, now on the contrary 
making it possible… At any rate, it is a question of surrendering … 
[to the material], following where it leads by connecting operations 
to a materiality, instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one 
addresses is less a matter submitted to the laws than a materiality 
possessing a nomos [law]. …
In short, what Simondon criticizes the hylomorphic model for 
is taking form and matter to be two terms defined separately, like 
the end of two half-chains whose connection can no longer be 
seen, like a simple relation of moulding behind which there is a 
perpetually variable, continuous modulation that it is no longer 
possible to grasp. The critique of the hylomorphic schema is based 
on ‘the existence, between form and matter, of a zone of medium 
and intermediary dimension’, of energetic, molecular dimension 
– a space unto itself that deploys its materiality through matter, a 
number unto itself that propels its traits through form.22 
It is easy to see the appeal of such an ontology of individu-
ation as a philosophical foundation for the nominalism of a 
contemporary art in which each work is imagined as individual 
to the point of singularity. Matter replaces form as the active 
principle. It only requires the additional equation of activity with 
agency to arrive at the monistic premiss of ‘new materialism’. 
But is such a ‘flat’ naturalist ontology sufficiently differentiated 
to comprehend anything as deeply social and historical, as 
well as formally intricate, as works of contemporary art? The 
22. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schitzophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 
pp. 408–9.
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problem lies in the unreflected character of the opposition 
between form and matter shared by hylomorphism and its critics 
alike. For Hegel, on the other hand, while form is central to the 
comprehension of any process of determination, and as such it is 
a general condition of intelligibility, it is not simply opposed to 
matter, but more importantly also to ‘content’. Indeed, the latter 
appears as the result of conceptual reflection of the dialectics of 
the form–matter relation.
A dialectical philosophy of form
In Hegel’s Science of Logic the concept of form is developed, from 
its most general meaning to more concrete ones, through a series 
of three dialectical oppositions – form and non-form (form as 
essence); form and matter; and form and content – while also 
bringing a range of other logical concepts into play along the way.
1. Form as essence, or, form and non-form
To form belongs in general everything determinate; it is a form 
determination in so far as it is something posited and consequently 
distinct from that of which it is the form… 
… the form determinations of essence, as determinatenesses of 
reflection, are, in their more precise determinateness … identity and 
difference. The latter partly as diversity, partly as opposition.23
In this respect, the concept of form does indeed gain its initial 
determinacy through its difference from something formless 
(‘that of which it is the form’). However, equally, the formless-
ness of its opposite is only determined as formless through its 
corresponding reflective opposition to form. At that point, it has 
become determined as ‘matter’.
23. Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 448–9.
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2. Form and matter
‘Matter [does not “precede” form, but rather] is determined as 
formless identity’, Hegel argues; that is, it is ‘determined as 
undetermined’ by its relation to form. As the first name for ‘that 
of which the form is the form’, we could say that matter is a kind 
of negative form. ‘Matter is a sheer abstraction’;24 as is the concept 
of form itself in its hylomorphic understanding. However, in this 
abstract identity with form, in having been formed (through its 
opposition to form), matter becomes content.
3. Form and content
Content, for Hegel, is the name for the unity of form and matter: 
‘the identical element in form and matter’; ‘content is [therefore] 
determinate in its own self ’.25 There is, then, a reproduction 
of form’s opposition to matter, within content, such that the 
determinateness of form is ‘indifference of content’. Dialectically, 
there is thus a doubling of each concept here: form and content.
4. Dialectical doubling of form
Regarding the antithesis of form and content it is essential to 
remember that the content is not formless, but that it has the form 
within itself just as much as the form is something external to it. 
We have here the doubling of form: on the one hand, as inwardly 
reflected, it is the content; on the other hand, as not reflected 
inwardly, it is the external existence, that is indifferent to the 
content. What is here present in-itself is the absolute relationship 
of form and content, i.e. the reciprocal overturning [Umschlagen] 
of one into the other, so that ‘content’ is nothing but the reciprocal 
overturning of form into content, and ‘form’ nothing but overturning 
of content into form.26 
24. Ibid., pp. 447–50.
25. Ibid., p. 455.
26. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. 
Harris, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hacking, 1991, # 133, p. 202. For form as a reflection 
determination of content, cf. Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being: Hegel’s False 
and His Genuine Ontology, trans. David Fernbach, London: Merlin Press, 1978, pp. 93–4.
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There is thus a primacy of ‘content’ over ‘matter’ in the dialecti-
cal determination of form. Content is developed form. Further-
more, where content is historical, it relies on a historically given 
state not of matter in general, but of determinate materials.
5. Dialectical doubling of content as developed, self-moving form 
[The] content is the developed form, i.e. both the externality and 
opposition of independent existences, and their identical relation, 
within which alone these distinct existences are what they are.
‘Developed’ form is thus a self-moving form: 
self-movement of the form is activity [Tätigkeit], activation 
[Betätigung] of the thing [Sache] as the real ground, which sublates 
itself into actuality, and the activation of the contingent actuality, 
i.e. of the conditions: their inward reflection and their self-sublation 
into … the actuality of the thing/matter [Sache].27
We thus end up with a concept of form as the self-moving 
activity of things (Sachen), sublating the content of ‘developed 
form’. Or, as Adorno put it in Aesthetic Theory with regard to the 
historical character of art: ‘the law of movement is the law of 
form’.28
Whereas in Hegel the concept of form is dialectically multi-
faceted, being constructed in a development running through 
a series of reflected oppositional pairings, in the critique of 
hylomorphism associated with Simondon and propounded 
by Deleuze and Guattari it is the simple Aristotelian concept 
of form that is the target, constructed exclusively through its 
opposition to ‘matter’, without reference to content. Thus when 
Deleuze and Guattari write of ‘less a matter submitted to the 
laws than a materiality possessing a nomos/law’, they appear 
not to be escaping ‘form’, but rather to be implicitly invoking 
27. Hegel, ibid., # 147, p. 220.
28. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 3.
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the dialectical concept of content, as the unity of form and 
matter, through which a higher-level opposition to form is then 
reproduced. And when they write of ‘the existence, between form 
and matter, of a zone of medium and intermediary dimension’, 
they appear themselves to be precisely ‘taking form and matter 
to be two terms defined separately’ – the main problem with the 
hylomorphic model. 
In this regard, Hegel does not just move beyond the abstract 
opposition of form and matter in the hylomorphic model, but 
dialectically incorporates the undialectical critique of hylo-
morphism into his concept of form. This is not to suggest that 
there are no conceptual problems remaining here, posed by the 
historical development of artistic form, but it does relocate the 
philosophical terrain on which they are to be pursued. This is the 
terrain of Adorno’s immanent critique of the dialectical short-
comings of Hegel’s own philosophy of art, in which a particular 
idealist metaphysics undialectically overdetermines the notion 
of artistic content.29 For in Hegel’s concept of art as the sensuous 
semblance of the idea, a predetermined metaphysical ‘content’ 
drives the deduction of its sensuous forms of appearance, despite 
their dialectical difference from it. However, with regard to social 
form, it is precisely the metaphysical idealism of this depiction 
of the process of form-determination that makes Hegel’s logic 
appropriate for the presentation of the social form of value, in 
Marx’s Capital, wherein social universality appears, precisely, only 
in ‘alienated’ and illusorily self-sufficient, ideal forms: commodity, 
money, capital. It is this illusorily self-sufficient ideality that makes 
capitalistic social form structurally homologous to the ontological 
status of the autonomous artwork.
However, if Hegel’s (broadly thematic) conception of 
artistic content betrays the deeper dialectical character of the 
29. See Aesthetic Theory, pp. 352ff.
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form–content distinction in his logic, Adorno’s own presentation 
of artistic form is itself betrayed by a lingering aestheticism, 
marked by his widespread use of the phrase ‘aesthetic form’ 
(ästhetische Form), when the philosophical context of his own 
text demands rather the continued use of his phrase ‘artistic 
form’ (kunsterlich Form) – and this, despite Adorno’s recognition 
of the fact that ‘Kant’s aesthetics had no emphatic concept of the 
artwork and relegated it to the level of a sublimated means of 
pleasure’, a ‘castrated hedonism, desire without desire’.30 Ironi-
cally, it is the lingering confusion spread by the use of the term 
‘aesthetic’ as synonymous to ‘art’ (first noted but then disavowed 
by Hegel at the outset of the Introduction to his Lectures on 
Beautiful Art) that vitiates a number of formulations in Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory. In Adorno, Hegel thus comes to act as a Trojan 
Horse for the maintenance of a residual Kantian aestheticism 
that is nonetheless formally disavowed. This is a consequence of 
the conflation of the enduring importance of the subjective me-
diation of the artwork with a Kantian use of the term ‘aesthetic’.
The philosophical moves required to update the Hegel–
Adorno problematic are thus (i) the replacement of Hegel’s 
understanding of the ‘content’ of art with Adorno’s more con-
cretely historical conception of content as a relationship between 
artistic materials and techniques, within a more fully dialecticized 
account of form–content relations;31 (ii) the de-aestheticization 
or conceptual expansion of Adorno’s conception of artistic form, 
rendering it consistent with his own concepts of technique and 
artistic materials; and hence (iii) a greater sense of the ways in 
which the artwork internally mediates art-institutional forms, 
as well as the most general social forms of commodity, money, 
30. Aesthetic Theory, pp. 253, 11.
31. Cf. Walter Benjamin’s remark that technique is ‘the point at which the unfruitful 
antithesis of form and content can be surpassed’. ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934), in 
Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927–1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary 
Smith, Cambridge MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, 
p. 777.
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capital and the state, along with other historically received and 
contested cultural forms, such as gender, race and sexuality.
In Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, following one 
line of thought in Nietzsche, the problematic of form is displaced 
altogether, in favour of a discourse on forces that appears in a 
historicized manner in relation to art, as follows: 
If there is a modern age … [t]he essential relation is no longer 
matter-forms (or substances-attributes); neither is it the continuous 
development of form and the continuous variation of matter. It is 
now a direct relation material-forces. A material is a molecularized 
matter, which must accordingly ‘harness’ forces of the Cosmos. 
There is no longer a matter that finds its corresponding principle of 
intelligibility. It is now a question of elaborating a material charged 
with harnessing forces of a different order: the visible material must 
capture nonvisible forces. … The forces to be captured are … the 
forces of an immaterial, nonformal and energetic Cosmos. … This 
is the postromantic turning point: the essential thing is no longer 
forms and matters, or themes, but forces, densities and intensities. 
… The problem is … now a problem of consistency or consolidation: 
how to consolidate the material, make it consistent, so that it can 
harness unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous forces?32
Consistency is indeed the problem – but neither the 
Nietzschean nor the Simondonian framework can offer more 
than a positivistic response to this issue. For this generalized 
cosmology of forces is indifferent to the immanent art/non-art 
relation, which is at the centre of the ‘life’ of contemporary art 
in its negotiation of the problem of form. The problematically 
differentiating, self-enclosing function of artistic form is instead 
replaced by Deleuze and Guattari by general concepts of capture 
and territorialization. Yet in a specifically artistic context, the 
problem of ‘consistency or consolidation’ – which for them 
32. A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 342–3. For a recent Simondonian development of this 
trajectory, with reference to musical performance, see Paulo de Assis, ‘Transduction 
and Ensembles of Transducers: Relaying Flows of Intensities’, in Michael Schwab, ed., 
Transpositions: Aesthetico-Epistemic Operators in Artistic Research, Leuven: Orpheus 
Institute, Ghent/Leuven University Press, 2018, pp. 245–65.
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replaces the problem of form, as a variant of the problem of 
unity – appears from an alternative perspective to be, once again, 
precisely the problem of form itself, in the guise of the problem 
of the organization of a work into coherence. 
Articulation, organization and coherence, or, 
the self-limiting self-suspension of the real
Alongside ‘articulation’, ‘coherence’ (Stimmigkeit) is the main 
category of form in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. ‘Coherence’ names 
the problem of form from the standpoint of the consistency of 
the whole.33 ‘Articulation’ (Artikulation) is the name of the same 
problem viewed from the practical standpoint of organizing the 
elements of the work into a unity. Organization (Organisation), 
‘the relation of elements to each other’ is what ‘constitutes 
form’. Form may thus be summarized as ‘the quintessence of all 
elements of logicality, or more broadly, coherence [Stimmigkeit] 
in artworks’.34 Indeed, it is not going too far to suggest that for 
Adorno, art is form.
As little as art is to be defined by any other element, it is simply 
identical with form. Every other element can be negated in the 
concept of form…
[Form is thus] the distinguishing aspect of art… [it is] that in 
artworks by which they become artworks.
Art has precisely the same chance of survival as does form, no 
better.35 
The reason for this is that it is through the artefact’s form or 
coherence that ‘each and every successful work separates itself 
from the merely existing’. In separating itself from the merely 
33. Stimmigkeit was rendered as ‘consistency’ in the first English translation of Aesthetic 
Theory; ‘coherence’ in the second. Coherence one might say, following Quine, is simply 
consistency at the level of the whole. 
34. Aesthetic Theory, pp. 143, 140.
35. Ibid., pp. 140, 144, 141.
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existing, ‘art opposes the empirical [der Empirie] through the 
element [Moment] of form’ and thereby constitutes its ‘autonomy’ 
at the level of the work itself. In so doing form appears as ‘the 
law of the transfiguration of the existing, counter to which it 
represents freedom’.36
However, this separation/opposition/transfiguration is not 
understood to be the act of some transcendental aesthetic 
subjectivity, but is rather an ‘objective’ quality of the work. And 
it is with reference to this objective quality that Adorno uses the 
term ‘aesthetic’. In this regard, in form, the work is said to ‘free 
itself from being simply a product of subjectivity’. ‘In artworks, 
form is aesthetic essentially insofar as it is an objective deter-
mination [objective Bestimmung].’ Appearance, though, remains 
ineliminable from the reference to aesthetic: 
aesthetic form is the objective organization within each artwork of 
what appears as bindingly eloquent.37
So, how does the relationship between the expansion of 
materials and formal limitation appear, in that ‘law of move-
ment’ or self-development of art that is for Adorno, at the highest 
level, art’s ‘law of form’? In the first place:
Form inevitably limits what is formed, for otherwise its concept 
would lose its specific difference to what is formed. … the artistic 
labour of forming is always a process of selecting, trimming, 
renouncing. Without rejection there is no form…38
This is what leads to the vitalist reaction against form. In this 
respect, ‘the expansion of available materials’ (which Adorno 
believed had ‘been much overestimated by those external to it’) 
‘is offset by the renunciation demanded of the artist by … the 
condition of the [particular] material’ selected.
36. Ibid., pp. 142, 5, 143, emphases added.
37. Ibid., pp. 142–3.
38. Ibid., p. 144.
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Every innovative expansion of the material into the unknown, going 
beyond the material’s given condition, is to a large extent a function 
of the material and its critique, which is defined by the material 
itself.39
Selection of artistic materials is thus the determining factor 
here. In accordance with ‘the Hegelian argument against Kant’: 
‘The moment a limit is posited, it is overstepped and that against 
which the limit was established is absorbed.’ Conversely, as a 
‘posited unity’, form ‘constantly suspends itself [suspendiert sie] as 
such: essential to it is that it interrupts itself through its other [its 
materials] just as the essence of its coherence is that it does not 
[ultimately] cohere’.40 Otherwise it would as reconciled to, and 
hence become affirmative of, actuality.
The question of the delimitation of the expansion of the 
concept of artistic form is thus not, after all, a question of the 
extent of the expansion of artistic materials, or the existence of 
some a priori limit to the extent of that expansion. The expansion 
is in principle infinite for art as such, already, but not of course 
for any particular individual work. The question is rather that of 
the modes of the self-limiting suspension of the ‘empirical reality’ 
of a portion of what exists, performed by individual works, 
closing this portion off from its functional context, organizing or 
reorganizing it, and positing it as an object of artistic reflection; 
then, in part, suspending that suspension. This is a self-limiting 
suspension which – in so far as ‘the mediation of form and 
content demands that we recognize aesthetic [=artistic] form as 
sedimented [sedimentierter] content’41 – requires social form as its 
immanent ‘content’. Here, at the level of social form, the expan-
sion to infinity of possible artistic materials, which makes every 
selection of artistic materials into an act of freedom, mimics the 
39. Ibid., p. 148.
40. Ibid., pp. 5 and 143, emphasis added.
41. Ibid., p. 5.
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self-positing structure of infinity of the accumulation of capital 
(infinite productivity). Just as the subject-like quality of the 
autonomous artwork as a self-determining form (an object that 
presents itself as behaving like a subject) mimics both the fantasy 
of the freedom of the self-possessing bourgeois individual and 
the actuality of the ‘automatic subject’ of capital alike. And it 
does so, not directly, or immediately, but, in each case, via the 
alienated form of its own mediated objectivity; mimicking the 
alienated universality of the objective structures of the social 
forms of value and culture – commodity, money, capital, state, 
gender, race, sexuality…
In so far as sociality appears as form, it has only an alienated 
objectivity.
The issue here is thus less the ‘sociological’ one of the inter-
nality of autonomous art to the structures of capitalist societies, 
via its commodity form (the contradictory art commodity); still 
less any relationship of artistic representation to capitalism, at a 
thematic level; and far more the internality of the structures and 
processes of capitalist societies to autonomous art, qua autono-
mous; that is, not in its dependent or heteronomous dimension 
(as is usually supposed), but in its very autonomy itself. 
Crisis as form
It is within this structural historical immanence that ‘crisis’ 
appears as form: as a particular historical instantiation of the 
contradictory social form of art’s autonomy, pushed to the point 
of a seemingly irresolvable antagonism or antinomy. For crisis, in 
so far as it is becoming ‘permanent’, is a new form of capitalistic 
sociality as such. It is part of the core of the concept of crisis, as 
a moment of decision within a transitional process (at its limit, 
in its medical origin, a transitional process within illness from 
life to death), that it cannot be permanent. What is increasingly 
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referred to as ‘permanent crisis’, then, is no longer technically 
a crisis, but a new and terrible form of social reproduction – a 
form of social reproduction grounded in the temporality of 
systemic disjunction that is part of the temporal form of histori-
cal contemporaneity produced by the ‘globalization’ of capital.42 
Capitalist crisis is always a crisis in the consistency or coherence 
of the social itself. Contemporary art, in the critical sense of that 
term, is the art of such a situation.
In brief, then, crisis is a new general form of the social. It 
is expressed by that crisis of art that takes the form of a crisis 
of form. Crisis of form is the primary form-determination of 
contemporary art. Each individual work participates in that 
expression to the extent to which it enacts, or mediates, the 
problem of form as the problem of the self-limiting suspension of 
the real. 
42. Cf. Peter Osborne, ‘A Sudden Topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis’, 
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